The Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission absolutely had to achieve one thing at its eighth annual meeting. That was to adopt a new conservation measure to address the serious overfishing of bigeye tuna occurring in waters under the commission\u2019s jurisdiction.<\/p>\n
It failed.<\/p>\n
The best it could do, given the fractious nature of its many members and their often contradictory interests, was to approve a one-year extension of the conservation measure it had adopted in 2008 to limit catches of bigeye and yellowfin. Intended to pare back bigeye fishing mortality to sustainable levels, the commission\u2019s Conservation and Management Measure (CMM) 2008-01 was supposed to achieve a 30 percent reduction in overall bigeye catches, with respect to average catches from 2001-2004, by the time the measure expired, at the end of 2011.<\/p>\n
That, too, didn\u2019t happen.<\/p>\n
According to a report from the scientists advising the commission, the limits CMM 2008-01 placed on purse seiners \u201chave not adequately constrained total purse-seine effort,\u201d with effort in 2010 actually increasing by almost a third and total catches increasing 1.3 percent. \u201cIt would certainly appear at face value that the conservation and management measure [2008-01] has not been particularly effective in restricting total purse seine effort,\u201d John Hampton, head of the commission\u2019s Scientific Committee, told the assembled commissioners, national delegates, and observers at the commission\u2019s annual meeting, held in late April in Guam.<\/p>\n
In the longline sector, which includes some 120 Honolulu-based vessels, provisional data suggest the bigeye catch for 2010 was roughly 23 percent lower than the baseline years of 2001-2004. \u201cHowever,\u201d the scientists\u2019 report continues, \u201cthis estimate is based on incomplete data and is despite an increase in fleet size.\u201d<\/p>\n
What\u2019s more, they go on to say, \u201creductions in catch may not necessarily correspond to reductions in fishing mortality.\u201d In other words, the numbers of bigeye are so low that catches will decline, not because of reduced effort, but simply because there are fewer fish. As Hampton noted, with characteristic understatement, this fact \u201cis a somewhat negative point in terms of the assessment of the effectiveness of this measure.\u201d<\/p>\n
Hawai`i\u2019s Special Case<\/i><\/b><\/p>\n
A special exemption was carved out for the Hawai`i longline fleet. It had only to reduce its catch from a 2004 baseline by 10 percent in the first year the conservation measure took effect (2009) and hold it at that level the remaining two years. In practice, that meant holding its annual catches to no more than 3,763 tons, based on a catch of 4,181 tons of bigeye caught in 2004.<\/p>\n
It didn\u2019t.<\/p>\n
While the fleet kept within that limit in 2009 and 2010, in 2011, it continued to fish even after the limit was reached.<\/p>\n
As readers of Environment Hawai`i<\/i> may recall from our report in January, the Hawai`i longliners were expected to hit the 3,763-ton limit on November 27. Thanks to a well-timed act of Congress, they were allowed to continue fishing for bigeye the rest of the year, with all catch taken after the effective date of the act (November 18) attributed to American Samoa, no matter where it was caught. According to the National Marine Fisheries Service Pacific Islands Fisheries Science Center, total bigeye catch of the Hawai`i longline fleet came to 4,232 metric tons, with 608 metric tons caught on or after the date that the fishery would have closed absent congressional intervention. Far from a decrease over the 2004 baseline, the 2011 catch, in other words, represented an actual increase of 15 percent.<\/p>\n
But the commission paid scant attention to the Hawai`i longliners, whose catch has recently accounted for 6 percent or less of the total longline catch of bigeye in the convention area, and an even smaller percentage of total bigeye catch by all gear types. For 2010, the total longline bigeye catch in the WCPFC area came to 64,953 metric tons. The total 2010 catch of bigeye from purse seiners, longliners, and other gear types came to more than 130,000 metric tons.<\/p>\n
The Big Picture<\/i><\/b><\/p>\n
The area under WCPFC\u2019s jurisdiction accounts for about 60 percent of all the tuna caught and consumed worldwide. When you add up total catches of all the varieties of tuna taken in the convention area \u2013 albacore, bigeye, skipjack, and yellowfin \u2013 by all the various types of fishing methods \u2013 purse seine, longline, pole-and-line, troll, and artisanal gears \u2013 the result approaches 2.5 million tons.<\/p>\n
About 70 percent of the total catch is lower-value skipjack tuna. This is the target of most of the purse seine vessels, which supply canneries in Southeast Asia, Papua New Guinea, and American Samoa. Although the annual haul of skipjack in the Pacific has more than tripled since 1990, fisheries scientists maintain that the stocks of skipjack \u2013 small, fast-growing, and prolific \u2013 are still robust.<\/p>\n
What caused the rise in skipjack catches to increase so substantially was the widespread introduction of man-made fish aggregating devices, or FADs, by purse seine fleets in the late 1990s. FADs take advantage of the tendency of tuna to congregate under floating objects, such as logs or even whale sharks. These aggregations include not just skipjack, but also juvenile yellowfin and bigeye as well as other non-target species, all of which are included in the haul as the nets are winched aboard the purse seiners.<\/p>\n
As a corollary to the increased use of FADs, the catch of juvenile bigeye by the purse seine fleets also increased \u2013 to the point that in some recent years, the total weight of the purse seine haul of bigeye has been equal to or even greater than that of the longliners. But there is a significant difference in the size of the catches by the two types of gear. Most of the bigeye caught by purse seiners range in length between eight and 23 inches. That contrasts with an average length of 51 inches in the bigeye taken by the longliners. In other words, many times more bigeye are taken by purse seiners than by longliners, even though, by weight, the takes of the two gear types are not that far apart.<\/p>\n
This helps explain why, in discussing how to conserve and rebuild the bigeye stocks in the convention area, so much attention is paid to purse seiners, even though they do not directly target bigeye. CMM 2008-01, for example, calls for a three-month ban on purse-seine sets on FADs and limits on fishing effort, in addition to the restrictions on longline catches.<\/p>\n
Despite the constraints, purse-seine effort has increased in recent years. As Hampton noted, from 2001 to 2004, the average number of vessel days in the WCPFC area (days when a purse seiner is actively fishing) was 39,559; by 2011, it was 57,500, an increase of 31 percent.<\/p>\n
At the commission meeting, both the European Union and the United States supported changing the three-month ban on FAD sets to a three-month closure, noting that this would eliminate enforcement problems.<\/p>\n
\u201cIt\u2019s a question of having a much more effective possibility of enforcement of these measures,\u201d said Roberto Cesari, head of the EU delegation. \u201cWe have been seeing problems in the FAD closure, and 100 percent observer coverage is not 100 percent, actually.\u201d<\/p>\n
Countries with tuna canneries objected, arguing this would cause an intolerable disruption of their supplies. Although proponents of the total closure suggested that it could be done in a rolling fashion, so that cannery deliveries would be uninterrupted, the proposal never gained much traction.<\/p>\n
High Seas Pockets<\/i><\/b><\/p>\n
One element of CMM 2008-01 that was not renewed was the closure of two high-seas pockets \u2013 \u201cdoughnut holes\u201d of international waters surrounded on all sides by exclusive economic zones of Pacific island states \u2013 in the western part of the convention area. Some conservation groups \u2013 notably Greenpeace \u2013 maintain that such closures constitute marine reserves and call for their expansion to other areas of the high seas.<\/p>\n
However, Hampton, of the commission\u2019s Scientific Committee, was skeptical about the effectiveness of the pocket closures as a conservation measure for bigeye, since it appears that much of the fishing effort that would have occurred in the pockets has simply shifted to neighboring territorial seas. \u201cWhat we\u2019ve seen,\u201d he told the commission, \u201cis probably the effort has gone into the EEZs. It\u2019s difficult to make an argument that the high seas closure has had a conservation benefit.\u201d<\/p>\n
The commission opened up the more westerly of the two pockets to fishing by 36 Philippine purse seiners, in hopes that it would relieve pressure on spawning stocks in the Philippine territorial seas. Although technically the pockets are open to purse seiners from other countries, it is unlikely many will be fishing there. Under conditions imposed by the coalition of island states that control most of the skipjack grounds in the South Pacific \u2013 a group known as the Parties to the Nauru Agreement \u2013 purse seiners that want to fish in their territorial seas may not fish in the high seas pocket areas as well.<\/p>\n
* * *<\/b><\/p>\n
Limited, Delayed Protection<\/b><\/p>\n
For Whitetip Sharks, Whales<\/b><\/p>\n
One issue on which the commission did agree was a proposal to increase protection of oceanic whitetip sharks. Keith Bigelow of the NMFS Pacific Islands Fisheries Science Center in Honolulu presented a report showing a 90 percent decline in the relative abundance of this species in Hawai`i longline catches from 1995 to 2010.<\/p>\n
Since 2006, the International Union for the Conservation of Nature has listed the species as vulnerable. \u201cIts large fins are highly prized in international trade although the carcass is often discarded,\u201d the IUCN notes. Not surprisingly, most of the Asian countries, where shark fins are still a delicacy, did not go along with the initial U.S. proposal.<\/p>\n
The head of the Chinese delegation objected to managing sharks on a species-by-species basis and also challenged the language to ban the sale of whitetip sharks from vessel decks, noting that it was very difficult to keep fishermen from doing this.<\/p>\n
The chief Japanese delegate also indicated that his country was disinclined to go along with the proposal as well. \u201cI talked with many parties, including NGO [non-governmental organization] observers,\u201d said Masanori Miyahara. \u201cI tried to persuade headquarters the last three days, and finally came up with a solution that was fortunately accepted by all parties.\u201d<\/p>\n
That solution involved eliminating the ban on \u201cselling or offering to sell from on board a fishing vessel \u2026 any oceanic whitetip shark, in whole or in part.\u201d However, the final version still prohibits the landing of oceanic whitetip sharks.<\/p>\n
And while the measure is to be \u201camended if appropriate at the 2012 Commission meeting,\u201d it does not enter into force until January 1, 2013.<\/p>\n
A similar start date was included in the measures intended to protect whales and whale sharks from purse seine operations. The head of the Australia delegation noted that the proposals were based on recommendations from the commission\u2019s Scientific Committee and had been initially brought forward two years ago. \u201cThis is an issue of ongoing concern,\u201d she said, \u201cand is drawing increasing attention and criticism by the international community.\u201d<\/p>\n
The proposals, which were introduced by Australia, \u201cdo two things,\u201d she continued. \u201cThey ban the deliberate setting on whale sharks and cetaceans, and, because we know from discussions with industry and observer reports, it\u2019s not always detectable when a whale shark or cetacean is present, both proposals do a second thing: they require steps be taken to allow the safe release of encircled animals.\u201d<\/p>\n
The United States supported the proposals, with the head of delegation, Russell Smith, observing, \u201cWe have had for over 25 years now bans on the intentional setting on cetaceans \u2026 It is a violation of U.S. law to set on either a live or dead whale\u2026 The issue of whale sharks has emerged more recently, and it is also a very important element in terms of ecosystem management in the Western Pacific. We are very much in support.\u201d Other commission members from South Pacific states, where whale shark tourism is a growing industry, endorsed the Australian measures.<\/p>\n
Japan did not. Miyahara said his delegation supported the \u201cspirit\u201d of the proposal; \u201cas far as Japanese crews are concerned, nobody wants to hurt a cetacean or whale shark.\u201d<\/p>\n
\u201cOur difficulty is enforceability,\u201d he continued. \u201cFrom the perspective of enforcement, it is impossible to identify which is intentional or which is not an intentional operation.\u201d His delegation had proposed an alternative measure calling for guidelines to minimize injury to encircled whales and whale sharks, \u201cand we are very serious to work with other parties to solve this issue, but unfortunately the Australian proposal doesn\u2019t work from our perspective.\u201d China seconded Japan\u2019s concerns.<\/p>\n
Sylvester Pokajam, the outspoken chair of the PNA coalition and head of the Papua New Guinea delegation, reminded the commission that \u201cthe PNA group have already implemented a prohibition on intentional setting on whale sharks as a condition of fishing in our EEZs, which is the vast majority of the fishery\u2026 Refusing to protect these animals in the small remaining part of the region would be inconsistent with convention provisions [requiring compatibility between fishing regulations within and outside EEZs] and would transfer a disproportionate conservation burden on us.\u201d<\/p>\n
By the fifth and last day of the commission\u2019s meeting, Australia had managed to address the concerns over intentionality raised by Japan and had revised the measure addressing cetaceans so that, as with the oceanic whitetip shark measure, its effective date was January 1, 2013. With those revisions, the measure was adopted.<\/p>\n
But the Japanese stood their ground on the whale shark measure, even though Australia had revised it along the same lines as the proposal for avoiding whales. Miyahara thanked Australia for its efforts, but, he added, \u201cUnfortunately, we are not in a position to say yes to this document at this meeting\u2026 We will be ready to discuss and hopefully agree on this proposal in December [at the next WCPFC meeting], but at this moment, I cannot.\u201d<\/p>\n
* * *<\/b><\/p>\n
American Samoa-Hawai`i Deal<\/b><\/p>\n
Not a Charter, NMFS Says<\/b><\/p>\n
One of the most important tasks facing WCPFC is to capture data on the amount of fish taken. Given the various arrangements that many of the member states have with foreign-flagged fleets, this is not as simple as one might think.<\/p>\n
Does the catch of a foreign vessel fishing under a charter arrangement with, say, Papua New Guinea report its catch through its flag state? Or does Papua New Guinea report the catch, since the vessel is part of its program to develop its own fisheries program? Either way, it\u2019s vital to the commission\u2019s business that the catch be reported accurately and in timely fashion.<\/p>\n
To address this issue, in 2009, the commission adopted a measure requiring the chartering nation or territory to provide the commission with information on each vessel with which it has a charter arrangement. The notice, which is also to be sent to the flag state, is to be made within 15 days of the arrangement going into effect \u2013 and never less than 72 hours in advance of the start of actual fishing by the charter vessel.<\/p>\n
The charter notification measure was to have expired on December 31, 2011, but was extended at the commission\u2019s March meeting for one year.<\/p>\n
But how does it apply? Specifically, does it apply to the charter arrangement that the Hawai`i Longline Association entered into with the government of American Samoa last November?<\/p>\n
According to an email from Mike Tosatto, the head of the NMFS Pacific Island Regional Office, \u201cthere is a lack of clarity and agreement on what constitutes a charter and who is responsible for what in a charter situation.\u201d<\/p>\n
\u201cFor the time being,\u201d Tosatto said, \u201conly the \u2018charters\u2019 that are easily definable are being notified to the commission. There are many situations that are not so clear, including some U.S. activities in the region\u2026. We do not believe any of the U.S. situations constitute a \u2018charter\u2019 under the notification CMM.\u201d<\/p>\n
The language in the congressional act allowing the American Samoa-HLA agreement refers specifically to the WCPFC and its provisions allowing \u201cparticipating territories\u201d (which would include American Samoa) to \u201cuse, assign, allocate, and manage catch limits\u201d of highly migratory species. It also requires the Secretary of Commerce, in annual reports to WCPFC, to attribute catches by vessels fishing under such an arrangement to the participating territory.<\/p>\n
\u201cI don\u2019t think we\u2019ve ever said this is a charter,\u201d Tosatto said in a phone interview. \u201cWe\u2019re clearly saying this is an arrangement between American Samoa and the Hawai`i Longline Association \u2026 that allows American Samoa to assign a level of their quota and which then requires us to report catch under that arrangement to the WCPFC. That does not equal a charter, as we currently understand what a charter is in the WCPFC.\u201d<\/p>\n
Nothing in the WCPFC convention defines a charter. However, the conservation and management measure addressing charter notification does \u2013 at least indirectly \u2013 and in a very broad way. The provisions of the measure, it states, apply to members and participating territories \u201cthat charter, lease, or enter into other mechanisms\u201d with vessels flagged to another state for the purpose \u201cof conducting fishing operations in the convention area as an integral part of the domestic fleet\u201d of the chartering entity. Similar language appears in the congressional act: \u201cVessels under such arrangements [as the one with American Samoa] are integral to the domestic fisheries of the U.S. participating territories.\u201d<\/p>\n
The HLA-American Samoa arrangement, Tosatto told Environment Hawai`i<\/i>, \u201cis more of an internal U.S. accounting exercise, not a charter between two countries as it\u2019s understood\u2026. In our assessment, it falls outside of our requirement to notify the commission of charters.\u201d<\/p>\n
Still, Tosatto says, the United States was preparing to submit to WCPFC a report on the U.S. bigeye catch for 2011 that attributes to American Samoa that fraction of the longliners\u2019 haul caught after the new law kicked in.<\/p>\n
That quantity will make up the \u201cthird piece,\u201d Tosatto said, of the American Samoa reported bigeye catch. First is the amount of bigeye hauled in by American Samoa fishers and landed in the territory. Second is the amount of bigeye caught outside the territorial waters of the United States by Hawai`i-based vessels holding American Samoa permits as well as Hawai`i permits. Their catch has traditionally been assigned to American Samoa. And the third piece is the tonnage landed in Honolulu by Hawai`i longliners after November 18.<\/p>\n
\u201cYou\u2019ll see a statistical bump in the American Samoa catch for 2011,\u201d Tosatto said. In past years, the average American Samoa catch landed in the territory was 173 metric tons. The dual-permitted catch for 2011 (none of which was landed in American Samoa) came to 464 tons. With the addition of the 652 tons caught by Hawai`i longliners from November 18 to the end of the year, the American Samoa reported catch is more than doubled from previous years.<\/p>\n
Apples and Oranges<\/i><\/b><\/p>\n
The United States is also exploring what some might call a nuanced position with respect to overfishing of bigeye in the Pacific. Most of the Hawai`i longliners operate in region 2 of the convention area \u2013 generally the northeastern quadrant \u2013 with a small fraction of the catch coming from region 4.<\/p>\n
\u201cWe\u2019re looking at the Hawai`i longline fishery,\u201d Tosatto said, \u201cand trying to gain traction on the idea that our adult bigeye fishery is not having the same impact on the stock like the purse seine fishery, which is taking bigeye juveniles.\u201d<\/p>\n
\u201cIt\u2019s an apples-and-oranges issue,\u201d he continued. \u201cA freezer longliner fishery, taking smaller fish from a problem area \u2013 it might be appropriate that they take a larger hit,\u201d in terms of their allowed catch limits.<\/p>\n
\u201cIn the long run, it\u2019s all about what impact our fishery is having, and whether it is demonstrably a lesser impact.\u201d<\/p>\n
— Patricia Tummons<\/i><\/p>\n
Volume 22, Number 11 May 2012<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
The Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission absolutely had to achieve one thing at its eighth annual meeting. That was to adopt a new conservation measure to address the serious overfishing of bigeye tuna occurring in waters under the commission’s … Continued<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":1,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[51],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-530","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","hentry","category-may-2012"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/environment-hawaii.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/530","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/environment-hawaii.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/environment-hawaii.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/environment-hawaii.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/1"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/environment-hawaii.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=530"}],"version-history":[{"count":0,"href":"https:\/\/environment-hawaii.org\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/530\/revisions"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/environment-hawaii.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=530"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/environment-hawaii.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=530"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/environment-hawaii.org\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=530"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}