Just as this issue was about to go to press, news broke of the grounding of the Star Connecticut. The opportunity was too good to pass up. We junked the stories on the effects of oil on Hawai`i’s wildlife and the pros and cons of using dispersants. Our update section (so newsy this month) was scrapped as well. The “Grass Roots” column, which on this subject, at least, seemed trivial even before the latest incident, bit the dust. Other articles were rewritten and trimmed. And the whole of the first editorial was consigned to the ash can of history. It just seemed, well, too cute. If this issue is a bit rougher around the edges than readers have come to expect, we apologize and hope to make up in substance what we may lack in style this month.
How Little We Know
Many of the points raised during the three days of hearings conducted by the National Transportation Safety Board and the Coast Guard are mentioned in our cover story. When the circumstances of that incident are placed against what has happened in previous groundings and spills, however, one thing stands out: Our ignorance.
Despite the heavy usage of the Barbers Point terminals and the incredible risks that are undertaken there daily in the loading and unloading of oil products, a definitive study on ocean currents in the area has yet to be done. Going back further, when the barge Hana spilled nearly three years ago, computer trajectories of ocean currents provided by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration were virtually worthless.
There is a price to pay for this ignorance — and it is a whole lot stiffer than the cost of any comprehensive study of ocean currents. The Legislature should find the money needed to start the kinds of research needed in this field — even if it has to take funds from the Hawai`i Visitors Bureau to pay for it. (Nor would it be unreasonable for Hawai`i’s petroleum refiners and retailers to kick in with a like amount.)
Just Do It
After the Star Connecticut grounded, the Coast Guard and NTSB had their hearing. Bruce Anderson of the state Department of Health announced that the state, too, would be looking into the safety of the Barbers Point terminals. (Remember that Chevron has an off-shore facility as well as PRI. Chevron’s differs from PRI’s in that it is an older model — one that lashes the ship to seven moorings rather than letting it pivot around a single mooring, as the PRI terminal does. That type of mooring is more difficult to tie up to, but generally requires less attention during cargo transfer operations.) Results from the federal investigation will not be released for perhaps another six months at the earliest (the report on the spill of the Exxon Houston, in spring of 1989, has not yet surfaced). And the state has yet to begin its investigation.
All this is a long way of saying that it would be foolish for agencies or corporations to hold off addressing many of the problems identified in the hearing on the Star Connecticut until the official reports are out. While during the hearing and afterward, public relations people and attorneys for PRI and Texaco went to unseemly lengths to paint themselves white and tar the other party, no real evidence exists to show negligence or indifference to matters of safety in this incident. Yet evidence exists in some abundance to indicate that safety can be improved. In light of that posturing, we are somewhat concerned that PRI and Texaco both might be reluctant to change policies or procedures now, on the bone-headed notion that to do so would be read as an admission of some failing. We hope that is not the case.
On Your Mark, Get Set…
The new federal Oil Pollution Act requires every oil-carrying vessel and terminal to have, within roughly three years, a Coast-Guard approved contingency plan that is to cover a worst-case scenario — that is, it is to explain what would happen if all of a vessel’s oil was lost in the worst imaginable weather conditions. The Coast Guard is to develop an Area Contingency Plan that is to “be adequate to remove a worst-case discharge, and to mitigate or prevent a substantial threat of such a discharge.” Given the existing technology, one may reasonably wonder whether such a requirement can possibly be satisfied.
Elsewhere in this issue, we describe the Coast Guard’s “worse-case” scenario for Hawai`i. It involves a 10-million gallon discharge that falls far short of the worst possible spill — about 35 million gallons short, in fact (45 million gallons being the capacity of the largest tankers that can be accommodated at Barbers Point).
But even the “worse-case” scenario poses an impossible challenge. For example, to cordon off the threatened sensitive shoreline areas on O`ahu alone would require 120 miles of boom. Even though the Clean Islands Council, an industry cooperative, has beefed up its response capability, available boom is still measured by the thousands of linear feet rather than the tens of miles.
In fact, storing 120 miles of boom requires some serious space. Is it reasonable to expect that Hawai`i should have on hand the quantities of material and equipment needed to respond to a worst-case disaster?
Of course it is. Indeed, it is unreasonable to think otherwise. Consider that roughly a quarter of O`ahu alone is given over to the military, reflecting the nation’s readiness to deal with threats to national security. Given that threats to environmental security are no less real (and a good deal more probable), why not use some of the land occupied by the military for storage of oil-spill response gear? Bellows, Kane`ohe, Pearl Harbor — all are near sensitive shorelines. They would make ideal staging areas for booms, skimmers, and oil-absorbent materials.
Not a Moment to Lose
The oil industry is establishing five regional response centers on the coasts of the mainland, with each center theoretically capable of responding to a spill of about 10 million gallons. Its plans call for a “tiered” response to spills: first using the equipment of the local oil spill cooperatives, such as the Clean Islands Council in Hawai`i, then using the resources of about nine intermediate stating areas, then, if that proves insufficient, summoning people and equipment from the closest regional center — and, if that still doesn’t cut it, calling in help from the other regional centers.
If one simply adds up the theoretical capability on paper, this plan should be able to contain a 45 million gallon spill — and the Marine Spill Response Corporation (the industry organization established to develop and implement this response plan) boasts of this.
But given the time it will take to mobilize these resources, the total response capability is probably far less than the sum of its parts. Time is a critical limiting factor in responding to oil spills — and if it takes 48 or 72 hours to bring in the needed equipment, it may as well take a year, for all the good that that equipment will do once it finally arrives on scene. All the more reason for Hawai`i to have on hand a sufficient supply of booms, absorbents, skimmers and other gear.
Dispersants, if applied promptly and properly, might be helpful in controlling damage. But far more needs to be known about their environmental impacts, short- and long-term, before they can be used with confidence. The 1991 Legislature should finance the necessary studies.
No Oil, No Spills
The best way to reduce the risk of oil spills is to reduce oil consumption. Seeking alternatives to fossil fuels should be encouraged, of course. But historically, some of those alternatives (nuclear energy, most notably; geothermal, most recently) have themselves been environmental time bombs.
The solution is elegant in its simplicity: Do not use any type of fossil fuels unless (a) an alternative source of energy (elbow grease, solar energy, pedal power) is not available and (b) the activity that you are undertaking is itself so essential you are willing to mess up the planet to do it.
Volume 1, Number 6 December 1990